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Abstract: Using an environmental contingency approach, Johnson
and Kaplan [1987] argued that virtually all management accounting
practices used at the time of their study had been developed by 1925
in response to increased uncertainty caused by geographical expan-
sion and large-scale operations. During the 1821 to 1860 subperiod,
the Hudson’s Bay Company had significant uncertainty which was
largely a result of the dynamic environment of its fur-trade opera-
tion. Consequently, it should have developed management account-
ing practices in response to uncertainty. Moreover, the management
accounting practices should have been less extensive in the
subperiods before and after 1821 to 1860, as these subperiods had
less uncertainty. The Company’s accounting and related records
were examined for 1670 to 1914, and provided evidence to support
the contention of Johnson and Kaplan that management accounting
practices evolved positively with uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 12] argued that by 1925
virtually all management accounting practices used at the time
of their study had been developed. Those practices had evolved
in the 19th and early 20th centuries to serve the information
and control needs of manufacturing and retail managers facing
a higher level of uncertainty caused by increasingly complex
and geographically dispersed operations. Complexity, Johnson
and Kaplan argued, had increased as these organizations grew
in size to capture economies of scale available with new tech-
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nologies and expansion from single to multiple activity opera-
tions.
The Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 62] argument was prem-
ised on the environmental contingency approach; management
accounting practices develop in response to the uncertainty.
Accordingly, the fur-trading operation of the historical, Lon-
don-based Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) should have de-
veloped management accounting practices for information and
control purposes as it faced substantial uncertainty while trad-
ing for furs in the frontiers of North America. Uncertainty was
greatest, it will be shown, from 1821 to 1860, but less in the
earlier (1670 to 1774) and later (1880 to 1914) subperiods.
Drawing upon the contingency approach as did Johnson and
Kaplan [1987], it is expected that given the extensive uncer-
tainty, the HBC’s management accounting practices would have
been the most developed for the 1821 to 1860 subperiod. Conse-
quently, as there was less uncertainty for 1670 to 1774 and for
1880 to 1914, management accounting would have been less
developed during those subperiods.
As for the organization of the paper, the next section briefly
describes the setting for the study. The subsequent section re-
views in more detail the HBC’s uncertainty. Then, the HBC’s
specific management accounting practices are described for
each subperiod. The penultimate section discusses the associa-
tion between uncertainty and management accounting prac-
tices. The final section contains some concluding comments
about the different ways management accounting practices
were used.
THE SETTING
The HBC is the world’s oldest commercial entity that con-
tinues its original line of business [Milgrom and Roberts, 1992,
p. 9]. Economists have judged the fur-trading HBC to have been
one of the few companies in the world to have earned an eco-
nomic rent, or, in other words, to have been uniquely successful
[Schoemaker, 1990, p. 1180]. The HBC is also unique in that
from 1670 to 1914, accounting and related documents have
been preserved and made accessible to researchers through the
Hudson’s Bay Company archives (HBCA).1  Because of the es-
1The HBCA are located at the Manitoba Archives in Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada. The archives cover the entire company history except for the last 30
years, which are still confidential. Researchers access the 1670 to (approxi-
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tablished business practices that prevailed during the study pe-
riod, a large part of the instructions between superiors and
subordinates was carefully recorded in letters. In addition, trad-
ers and other officers were required by the Committee (or, as it
was called in the latter part of the 19th century, the Board of
Directors) to maintain narrative journals of their daily business
activities, thereby adding to the archive’s richness.
In 1670, the HBC was incorporated by a royal charter from
England’s King Charles II to Prince Rupert and his 17 fellow
adventurers. The charter provided a monopoly on trade and
commerce for Rupert’s Land, consisting of the lands whose riv-
ers and streams drain into the Hudson Bay. The HBC soon
established posts (e.g.; Albany, Moose, and York) at the mouths
of rivers flowing into the Hudson Bay. This pattern was known
as a “factory system,” meaning that the HBC had opted for the
trading methods used by other English merchants in Africa and
Asia [Ray and Freeman, 1978, p. 30]. With this system the bulk
of the trade was conducted at coastal establishments rather
than from aboard ships. For the first hundred years, the ap-
proach to fur acquisition was to wait for the aborigines at the
bayside posts and then to convince them to return annually.
Early competition came from the French colony in Canada
known as New France. Confrontation was often violent as the
HBC posts were being captured by the French colonists. In
1713, the Treaty of Utrecht confirmed the British possession of
the Hudson Bay. Without direct French competition, trade im-
proved and the HBC experienced profitability and even prosper-
ity, which was indicated by a constant succession of dividends
and by the accumulation of a substantial reserve of capital
[Rich, 1960a, p. 58]. Although excluded from the Bay, the
French of Montreal did not withdraw from the fur trade. In-
stead, they intercepted the aborigines inland, away from the
Bay and up the Moose and the Eastmain Rivers [Rich, 1960a, p.
503], shortening the aboriginal trade trips. After 1730, the
French competed from the southwest as La Verendrye and his
sons developed a series of posts to intercept the aborigines from
the west on their way to the Bay [Rich, 1960a, pp. 517-524].
These posts were supplied from Montreal via the Great Lakes.
mately) 1914 materials via microfilm which can be borrowed. These materials
are in relatively good condition; nearly everything can be read although some
materials take more reading time than others. Most post-1914 materials are
restricted in their use because they have not been catalogued and microfilmed.
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There were a number of reasons, in addition to decreased
competition, for improved performance during the 1713 to
1763 subperiod. The HBC captains were more skilled with navi-
gating the Atlantic Ocean and the Hudson Bay, and the HBC
Committee understood more about trading with the aborigines.
Although food and clothing were primarily received from Lon-
don and from aborigines through trade, some HBC employees
had become competent at hunting and fishing.
France lost its Canadian territories with the British con-
quest of Canada in 1763 [Rich, 1960a, p. 660]. This encouraged
“the rush of the English into Rupert’s Land” from the U.S. and
England [Rich, 1960b, p. 13]. These “peddlers” were able to
form partnerships with French Canadians and one another, and
to expand the trade to the south and west of the Bay to such an
extent that the HBC’s trade was dramatically harmed [Rich,
1960b, p. 18]. Increasingly fewer aboriginal furs reached the
bayside posts. In 1774, the HBC reacted by finally establishing
a post inland named Cumberland House. More inland posts
were set up in subsequent years.
By 1783, a group of Montreal traders formed the North
West Company (NWC) to reduce costs and competition among
themselves, and to compete more effectively with the HBC
[Rich, 1960b, p. 119]. The NWC was reorganized in 1787 to
include the entire resources of the Montreal traders [Rich,
1960b, p. 122]. The organization of the NWC and the expansion
of the HBC inland led to intensified competition between the
two companies. By 1816, their competition further intensified
with the depletion of beaver in many areas; they competed
head-to-head farther west, into present-day Saskatchewan and
Alberta, and later still farther west and north.
Major changes resulted from the move inland. There was a
longer lag, now a minimum of two or three years as opposed to
one or two, from shipment of trade goods and supplies to the
eventual sale of furs in London. There was also the challenge of
“living off the land” as supplies were expensive to transport
inland. The HBC responded to the challenges by introducing in
1810 “a Radical Change in the System of Carrying on the
Trade” [HBCA, reels 6 and 39]. In effect, the Committee as-
signed more responsibility to senior managers for coordinating
operations. Creating two areas and appointing two superintend-
ents for managing them was recognition that more detailed
coordination was needed. Furthermore, the introduction of in-
centives for officers was also recognition of the need to comple-
ment existing management methods. Another attribute of the
4
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“retrenching system” of 1810 was a push by the Committee for
better information. This need led to a system of annual reports
being submitted by managers to superiors which required man-
agers who could write well and to understand, if not to keep,
accounts [Burley, 1993, p. 66].
The result of this transformation was more competition
and even hostility between the HBC and the NWC. Both compa-
nies were suffering seriously when, as a solution, they merged
in 1821, retaining the HBC name. Ultimate control remained in
London with a new group of owners, also called the Committee.
The Committee hired an inland governor, or governors2 , and
geographically divided the operations into departments, dis-
tricts, and posts. Generally, districts were managed by chief
factors, while posts within districts tended to be managed by
chief traders.
In 1870, the HBC gave up its right to Rupert’s Land to the
Canadian government in exchange for land and cash. The influx
of settlers was made easier by the modernization of communi-
cations and transportation. Steamboats, railways, and the tele-
graph replaced the HBC transportation network of crude boats.
At the same time, the settlers contributed to an infrastructure
that allowed the HBC to stop providing its employees with food
and clothing.
UNCERTAINTY OVER TIME
High uncertainty was defined by Duncan (1972, pp. 318-
321) as complexity in a dynamic environment. More specifi-
cally, he measured high uncertainty in terms of a large number
of parts3  that differ and which change in unpredictable ways.
This description parallelled the manufacturing and retail firms
discussed by Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 95]; those firms had
expanded in size and into additional businesses and products,
as well as geographically. The consequence was many more
2After the amalgamation of the HBC with the NWC in 1821, there were two
governors. George Simpson was the governor for the larger Northern Depart-
ment. However, he had at least some responsibility for all departments. In
1826, he became governor of the Southern Department and, therefore, head of
all departments. Nevertheless, it was not until 1839 that he was officially
awarded the grand title of governor-in-chief [Williams, 1973, p. xii].
3Duncan actually used the terms “factors and components.” As the word
“factor” is used in another way in this research, the synonym “part” is used
instead.
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parts which were increasingly different. Also, as the managers
of these firms did not fully understand them, the parts were
perceived to change for reasons not fully understood.
The HBC also experienced a high level of uncertainty.
Based in London, it operated a multifaceted, dispersed fur-trad-
ing business in North America. Although trading per se was not
particularly complicated, the same was not the case with the
long and difficult trip to bring trade goods to the aborigines
and then return to London with the furs. Furthermore, the
simple act of trading was complicated by there being neither a
monetary system nor an infrastructure. Consequently, the
HBC’s fur-trading operation had many different parts that were
not always predictable.
During the period 1670 to 1914, uncertainty was affected
by the HBC’s strategy and operating context. Of course, strategy
and context were interrelated; nevertheless, they each affected
the level of uncertainty. After the commencement of operations
in North America, there were two major turning points in re-
gard to uncertainty. The first occurred in 1774 when the HBC
pursued its new strategy of inland trade rather than continuing
from the handful of posts on the shore of the Bay. This change
in strategy increased uncertainty. However, uncertainty de-
creased with the second turning point, the modernization of
communications and transportation. These two turning points
divide the entire study period into three subperiods with re-
spect to uncertainty. Uncertainty was greatest from 1821 to
1860, compared to the prior (1670 to 1774) and subsequent
(1880 to 1914) periods. The demarcation between subperiods
recognizes that there were transitions which do not fit well with
the subperiod on either side. More specifically, although the
move inland occurred in a small way in 1774, it took until 1821
before changes were implemented in response to the new strat-
egy. Similarly, modernization started gradually in 1859, but the
momentum was not significant until the 1880s. The uncertainty
for each subperiod will now be discussed
1821 to 1860: Uncertainty increased after 1774 as the HBC ex-
panded inland from the Bay. Following the merger with the
NWC in 1821, the HBC traded over half a continent, from Lab-
rador on the Atlantic Ocean to Vancouver Island on the Pacific
Ocean, from the Canada-U.S. border on the south to Great
Slave Lake on the north, including parts of the present states of
Washington and Oregon. The mode of transportation among
the dispersed employees and posts (1,983 and 172 respectively
6
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in 1821) was the birch-bark canoe, and later crude (York) boats.
Uncertainty was increased by the time lag between the shipping
of the outfit of trade goods and supplies and the eventual re-
ceipt of monies from the sale of the furs. This lag might be two
or three years to account for the shipment from London to a
Canadian port, offloading, and freighting, often more than
1,000 miles by rivers and lakes, to inland posts. From there the
trade goods were exchanged for furs. A reverse trip was neces-
sary to transport the furs to market in Europe. At each stage
uncertainty could increase because of natural disasters, and at
each market there were variations with actual prices and costs.
In this context, uncertainty can be categorized to include
inland travel on rivers and lakes, trade conditions, and living off
the land. These categories of uncertainty relate to major group-
ings of parts or activities in the fur-trade operation. The uncer-
tainty relates to the nature of the HBC’s business which
changed over the study period. These discussions are summa-
rized in Exhibit 1.
Inland travel was particularly complicated. The ships from
London had to be unloaded; then the trade goods and supplies
either stored in warehouses or directly loaded into canoes or
boats for shipment to posts. The trips took weeks or months,
and for each day there were demanding tasks in order to ma-
neuver man-powered canoes and boats along rocky-bottomed
rivers and lakes. These trips often required portages or the car-
rying of the canoes, boats, and their contents around rapids or
waterfalls, or from one water system to another. Portages were
physically demanding on the men, but as the operations ex-
panded to 200 boats and 1,200 men [Glover, 1949, p. 19],
horses were used for the task. Roads were built at the portages
along with stations for maintaining the horses and men to expe-
dite portaging.
Predictability with inland travel was problematic for sev-
eral reasons. First, employee actions were unpredictable; i.e.,
behavior of the employees with canoes and boats could not be
observed. Efforts and diligence were unknown. Second, there
was environmental uncertainty from random events; i.e., the
arrival times at the various posts could not be predicted with so
many weather and environmental factors interfering with
schedules. Moreover, exact distances between posts were uncer-
tain. Third, there was the opportunistic behavior of employees;
i.e., the out-of-sight employees could misuse equipment, trade
goods, or supplies.
7
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EXHIBIT 1
Uncertainty at the HBC
Components of High Perceived Uncertainty
Subperiod Significant Parts Differences Predictability
1670-1774 Inland travel Not applicable Not applicable
Trade conditions Many Not predictable because
* no monetary of aboriginal languages,
 * system customs
* barter economy
Living off the land Not applicable Not applicable
* no infrastructure
* largely London
 * supplies
* little obtained
 * locally
1821-1860 Inland travel Many Not predictable because
* loading of natural dangers,
* daily trips weather, frontier
* portages conditions, and
 * (manpower, isolation
 * stations, horses)
* 200 boats
* 1200 voyagers
Trade conditions Many More unpredictable
* no monetary because of additional
 * system aboriginal languages,
* barter economy customs
Living off the land Many Very unpredictable
* no infrastructure because of variations
* few London in weather, migration
  * supplies patterns, and soil
* most supplies  fertility
 * obtained
 * locally
1880-1914 Inland travel Many fewer Predictable
* railroad
* steamboats
Trade conditions Fewer More predictable,
* monetary aborigines more
 * system exposed to European
* cash economy languages and customs
Living off the land Not applicable Not applicable
8
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Trade conditions had many different parameters because of
the lack of a monetary system. A large number of furs were
traded for an even larger number of European trade goods. As
there was a barter system, there were no market prices for furs
and trade goods. Predictability was further complicated by dis-
tance and the large number of different aboriginal groups who
differed in languages and customs. Moreover, the behaviors of
traders could not be observed to ensure they acted in the best
interests of the HBC.
Food and clothing could not be economically sent from
London because of high transportation costs, and there was no
infrastructure in North America to supply them. Consequently,
living off the land was necessary. Food and clothing had to be
supplied locally at hundreds of posts either by HBC employees
or through trade. Hunting, fishing, and farming were pursued.
There was transformation uncertainty as employee behavior
could not be observed. Weather was always crucial for these
primary activities; it varied significantly because of seasons and
according to geographical location. Furthermore, hunting and
fishing were precarious because of unpredictable migration
patterns. In addition, the short growing season and infertile
soil, especially at some northern posts, yielded poor and uncer-
tain crops.
1670 to 1774: Overall there was less uncertainty during this
earlier subperiod. One reason was that there was no inland
travel, with all its different and often unpredictable parts, be-
cause all trade was conducted at bayside posts. There was also
less uncertainty in regard to living off the land. Food and cloth-
ing were relatively inexpensive to ship when all posts were at
the bayside. To supplement and add variety to the European
food, a few crops were grown at some of the semi-Arctic
bayside posts. In addition, HBC employees fished and hunted,
and aborigines were hired to do the same.
However, the 1670 to 1774 subperiod demonstrated uncer-
tainty similar to the 1821 to 1860 subperiod in regard to trade
conditions. Trade was complicated by the lack of a monetary
system, in conjunction with aboriginal languages and customs,
multiple goods, and multiple fur varieties. One difference was
that there were fewer different aboriginal groups at the bayside
posts. North American aborigines had developed a system of
middlemen for transporting furs to bayside posts. The distant
aborigines who did the trapping would trade with others who
9
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would take the furs to the bayside posts or trade with still
others who made the trip [Innis, 1956, pp. 119-122].
1880 to 1914: This subperiod also had less uncertainty than
during 1821 to 1860. Uncertainty of inland travel was drasti-
cally reduced by the modernization of communications and
transportation. The first significant change came with the intro-
duction in 1859 of a steamboat on the Red River, which flows
from the U.S. into the present-day Canadian province of
Manitoba. This boat greatly increased the speed, reliability, and
volume of goods that could be delivered in a single trip. Steam-
boats were introduced on the Saskatchewan River in 1874,
making it the baseline for transportation in the region of the
present-day Canadian provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
and Alberta [Innis, 1956, p. 344].
In 1878, the American Northern Pacific Railway was ex-
tended to Winnipeg, in effect rendering steamboats obsolete on
the Red River [Barris, 1977, p. 41]. The transcontinental Cana-
dian Pacific Railway, however, had a much greater impact
when it linked the eastern and western extremities of Canada in
1885. Rail was not only cheaper than the York boats and steam-
boats, it was also faster and more reliable. Modernization sig-
nificantly reduced the HBC’s uncertainty with inland travel.
Uncertainty with trade conditions also declined signifi-
cantly during 1880 to 1914. With modernization, the barter sys-
tem was replaced with a cash economy complete with competi-
tive prices. The development of better communications made it
possible for traders to obtain the current market price of furs
offered for auction in London. In this respect the mail service
and the increasing circulation of newspapers were important,
but it was the introduction of the telegraph which revolution-
ized the information flow to the posts. Completed in 1887, the
telegraph broke the HBC’s monopoly on information [Ray,
1990, p. 66].
Less importance was placed on living off the land during
this subperiod. An infrastructure developed for providing food
and clothing [HBCA, reel 733, transcribed by Bowsfield, 1977,
p. 85]. Farmers were settling the prairies and producing grain
crops and other farm products. Small businesses that produced
an increasing variety of food and clothing products started in
the major urban centres of Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary,
Edmonton, and Winnipeg. The HBC did not have to be
self-sufficient any longer. In-house production was replaced,
allowing the HBC largely to withdraw from responsibilities for
10
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feeding and clothing employees. The earlier uncertainty with
these responsibilities was eliminated.
In summary, the 1670 to 1914 period exhibited three types
of uncertainty – inland travel on rivers and lakes, trade condi-
tions, and living off the land. Within the context of Duncan’s
[1972] definition, each uncertainty type was rated as high for
1821 to 1860. Lower uncertainty was assessed for all categories
of uncertainty for the 1880 to 1914 subperiod. However, for
1670 to 1774, trade conditions were judged to demonstrate high
uncertainty, while inland travel and living off the land were
deemed to have lower uncertainty. Consequently, there is evi-
dence supporting the contention that uncertainty was greater
for the HBC during 1821 to 1860 than in either the prior (1670
to 1774) or the subsequent (1880 to 1914) subperiod.
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
HBC’s management accounting practices for the three
subperiods were described in depth elsewhere (i.e., respectively,
Roy and Spraakman [1996], Spraakman and Davidson [1998],
Spraakman and Wilkie [1998]). Although the use of manage-
ment accounting practices varied among the three subperiods,
four management accounting techniques were used virtually
throughout the period from 1670 to 1914 — operating state-
ments, budgets (i.e., outfits and indents), inventory records,
and standards. These methods will be described below, but note
that each technique is comparable to contemporary practice.
During the 1670 to 1914 study period, each functioned as a
component of various management accounting systems.
OPERATING STATEMENTS
1821 to 1860: The purpose of the accounting records in the
1821 to 1860 subperiod was set out in an 1843 memorandum
by the HBC’s London-based accountant, Edward Roberts
[HBCA, reel 508]. “Directions for Keeping Accounts” described
the purpose of the “country accounts” as furnishing the cost of
the furs from each district. These costs, in conjunction with
recent fur prices provided by the Committee, allowed for the
calculation of profit for each district. Subsequently, the district
results were combined into department totals. This memoran-
dum stated that profitability indicated the “merit” of managers.
As revenues in the country accounts were calculated using past
prices, actual profits calculated by the London office had to
await the sale of furs at public auctions, typically six months to
11
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two or more years after the end of the outfit year [e.g., HBCA,
reel 480].
The country accounts were prepared with debits and cred-
its on the basis of an outfit, the annual shipment of trade goods
and supplies for the trade expedition with the aborigines, rather
than for a set calendar period. What was called a balance sheet
was merely a means of closing the district books at the end of
the outfit. The balancing figure was the profit (or loss). Exhibit
2 contains an example of the balance sheet for the Severn Dis-
trict [HBCA, reel 1M590]. The same format was used for de-
partments [e.g., HBCA, reel 1M690] and irregularly for posts
[e.g., HBCA, reel 1M567]. Each line, except the balancing
(profit) line, was the summary of one or more books or records,
which will be described subsequently.
EXHIBIT 2
Severn District Balance Sheet, Outfit 18234
(Left side) Pounds Shillings Pence
To inventory 1st June 1713 16 8
To received from York Factory 886 13 9
To servant wages 391 — —
To balance 1711   3  10
4702 14 3
(Right side)
By supplies to York Factory 24 9 10
By servants book debts in the
district 215 19 6
By advances to servants not
residing in the district 50  19 4
By inventory in the district 570  7 1
By inventory at Skallop Creek 591 9 2
By returns of furs 3249   9   4
4702 14 3
Source: HBCA [reel 1M590].
The debit entry, “inventory 1st June,” was the beginning
inventory of trade goods and supplies. This count was done
after the winter trapping and trading season at about the time
the furs were being transported to York Factory or Montreal for
shipment to London. Items for each category of trade goods
and supplies were physically counted and then valued at cost
plus a percentage markup for transportation and storage
[HBCA, reel 1M567].
4Note: 12 pence were equal to 1 shilling, and 20 shillings were equal to 1
pound.
12
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The 1832-1833 “Store Balance Book” was an example of the
Northern Department’s meticulous inventory records [HBCA,
reel 1M846]. In brief, over 56 double pages, there was a com-
plete reconciliation of beginning inventory, importation of
trade goods and supplies (i.e., the current year outfit), distribu-
tion, and ending inventory. Furthermore, the store balance
book reconciled the stock of supplies held in the districts and
depots of the department with the distribution of supplies for
each outfit.
The next debit item in Exhibit 2, “received from York Fac-
tory,” was the district’s cost of the trade goods and supplies
received in the current outfit year from London via York Fac-
tory or Montreal. The HBC controlled the movement of trade
goods and supplies with invoices. There were the “Invoice
Books of Shipments” to record what was shipped from London.
Each package was numbered and the contents recorded with
the value [HBCA, reel 367]. Invoices were also employed with
the subsequent shipment of trade goods and supplies from
ports, such as York Factory, to districts and posts. These in-
voices were recorded in “Charges to Districts, Account of the
Charges, Affixed to Outfit Invoices” [HBCA, reel 1M688].
Shipped items were listed with quantities, unit prices, and cost
per item. Packing sheets were used as aids to ensure that all
items were included [HBCA, reel 1M689]. “Bills of Lading”
were also used for checking the contents of canoes and boats
[HBCA, reel 1M690] as they recorded items of trade goods and
supplies, their destination, and the person responsible for them.
Check marks beside the listed items imply a verification system
for ensuring the items were loaded. A standard (percentage)
advance was added to the cost of each item to compensate for
the actual transportation and storage costs [HBCA, reel 195].
Another debit in Exhibit 2 was the wages paid to employees
or servants. This cost was supported by various supplementary
documents. First, there was a contract between the employee
and the HBC, which specified obligations for both parties. Sec-
ond, cash payments to employees were recorded in a depart-
mental journal called “Servants Bills,” and additional headings
“Cash Advances in Montreal” and “Cash Advances in London”
were used to record advances when employees were at those
locations [HBCA, reel 1M689]. A review of those documents
found a system of check marks that implied a later transfer to
other documents. There was also the use of debits and credits
to transfer advances when the recipient was transferred to an-
other district. Third, employee payments were reconciled with
13
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the document, “York Employee Balances” [HBCA, reel 1M687].
The 1823 edition contained a list of employees, recorded
charges (debits) and wages (credits), and a reconciliation.
Fourth, to keep track of employees, there was also an “Engage-
ment Register” [HBCA, reel 1M853] which sequentially num-
bered and listed employees in alphabetical order. It included
the following employee specifics – name, age, parish, capacity,
where engaged, date, term, years engaged for service, date con-
tract expires, deserted, dead or home date, wages, and amount
of extra services.
The last debit item in Exhibit 2 was the balance. This was
the profit (if a debit) or loss (if a credit, which would be shown
on the right side). It was a calculated number equal to the total
of the credits less the debits. In effect, the balance equalled the
estimated sales value of the furs less the cost of trade goods,
supplies, and employees.
The credit item in Exhibit 2, “inventory in the district,” was
the ending inventory. For each district, it was the summation of
the actual inventories at all posts. For the example in Exhibit 2,
the ”inventory at Skallop Creek” was shown separately, prob-
ably because of the large amount at that location. As an offset
to wage payments, the credit entry for “servants’ book debts”
was equal to all sales to employees during the outfit year. Two
documents were used to accumulate these debts. One was “Ac-
counts of Sales to Servants, In the General Shope York Factory
Summer” [HBCA, reel 1M688]. The 1822 edition was typical in
recording the charges to employees from York Factory and
other districts/posts. There were no totals, and the check marks
implied that the charges were transferred to other accounts.
The second was the “Register of York Factory and its Depen-
dencies” [HBCA, reel 1M688]. It listed employees and spanned
more than a single year. For each employee there was an item-
ization of goods received with notation of where, post or dis-
trict, received [e.g., HBCA, reel 1M688].
Exhibit 2 also shows credit entries for “supplies to York
Factory” and “advances to servants not residing in the district.”
These were the means of reflecting that the costs of inventories
and employees were reduced because, respectively, of the part
returned or the employees who were working elsewhere. The
last credit item in Exhibit 2, “returns of furs,” equalled the
value of furs received by the district in exchange for trade
goods. As revenue, it was also equal to the number of furs by
type multiplied by the unit prices, which were based on the
previously mentioned recent fur prices supplied by the Commit-
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tee. The calculation of total revenue was supplemented by post
documentation. Each post maintained a “Debt book” [e.g.,
HBCA, reel 1M689], which listed each aboriginal trapper, the
goods he received, and furs supplied. The quantities, unit cost,
and cost of items received of a trade good were also recorded.
Amounts were subtracted for the value of furs that the ab-
origine provided the company. Subtotals were prepared for
each page, carried forward, and totaled. Furthermore, the “Fur
Returns” schedule kept track of furs by type by district. The
schedule for the outfit year ending June 1, 1844 showed 40
categories of fur against 13 districts [HBCA, reel 1M813].
1670 to 1774: In this earlier subperiod, the HBC had a detailed
system for post accounting which recorded entries to all ledger
accounts in terms of a prime beaver pelt called a “made bea-
ver.” The values of trading goods, supplies, and furs were con-
vertible into made beaver. In addition to ledger accounts and
other documents for tracking the flow of trading goods and
supplies, there was a made-beaver-denominated “balance
sheet,” which in effect was also a profit and loss statement
similar to that in Exhibit 2. On one of the two sides of the
balance sheet, there were beginning inventories of trade goods
and supplies, trade goods and supplies received, cost of employ-
ees, and profit if one existed. On the other side, there were the
ending inventories, value of sales, and the loss if one existed.
The made-beaver approach to accounting, described by Ray
and Freeman [1978], was in effect at least from 1692 [e.g.,
HBCA, reel 1M406]. It worked well in determining the relative
profits of posts when a monetary system did not exist and when
all posts had nearly the same transportation costs, as they were
all located on the coast of the Bay. The financial crisis in the
early 1800s forced the HBC to abandon its rigid made-beaver
accounting system in favor of a system that incorporated varia-
tions in transportation costs caused by different distances from
the Hudson Bay.
The 1810 reorganization placed more importance on ac-
counting records. First, they were to be denominated in pounds
sterling, rather than the more than the century-old made-beaver
practice. Second, accountants were appointed with responsi-
bilities that included preparing accurate accounts, correctly re-
cording inventory of goods on hand at the end of the year at the
factory and at each trading house within the limits of the fac-
tory, and correctly recording debts due by aborigines and em-
ployees.
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1880 to 1914: The 1821-1860 approach to accounting was con-
tinued with the only significant change being the use of pre-
printed forms, despite an influx of settlers which induced the
HBC to expand into sales shops to serve the retail market. The
1887 balance sheets (i.e., operating statements) and related
documents were being prepared for posts, districts, and depart-
ments on 31 pre-printed forms, many of which included more
than one page [HBCA, reel 3M224]. Improved communications
and transportation had led the HBC to demand some monthly
reports from posts and sales shops.
Then, in 1889, the HBC’s auditor made suggestions for im-
proving financial reporting. This forward move was prompted
by the increasing role played by cash in the purchase of furs
from trappers and in the purchase of trade goods and supplies
from North American suppliers. The auditor believed that the
wide variety of items included in inventory led to inaccurate
information; e.g., “[a] large increase of payments might indicate
a new policy of purchasing supplies elsewhere than in England,
or might mean that a greater portion of the furs shipped had
been purchased for cash” [HBCA, reel 508]. His contention was
supported by item 70 of the HBC’s 1887 “Rules and Regula-
tions,” which listed the inventory subcategories to include such
heterogeneous assets as trading goods, supplies, country-made
articles, country articles, livestock, outstanding balances, build-
ings and land, and ships and steamers [HBCA, reel 3M224].
The auditor’s recommendations led to the division of the
inventory account into cash, goods held for barter, furs and
country produce, livestock, ships and steamboats, and other
assets. The purpose was to differentiate between the amount of
assets and liabilities for current accounts, for barter, and for
other purposes [HBCA, reel 508].
In 1891, Commissioner Chipman proposed that the Board
of Directors change the accounting from outfits to fiscal years
[HBCA, reel 508]. This suggestion was accepted and had a sub-
stantial impact on reporting [HBCA, reel 3M230]. With outfit
years, the books were not being closed until after the sale of
furs in London, which was one year or more after the calendar
end of the outfit. This time lag also meant that the accounting
reports for districts had to be completed at the London office,
which, therefore, had to maintain and complete those financial
records. The resulting accounting system was complicated, ex-
pensive, and late in providing information for effective decision
making.
Using a fiscal year meant that the books could be closed in
16
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Canada. There was no need to wait for the furs to be sold.
Unsold furs were merely valued as inventory. When sold, the
revenue would accrue to the respective post or district in the
year they were actually sold. No district or post accounting
reports needed to be prepared at the London office, which was
than able to simplify its accounting processes by keeping only
one continuous account with the fur trade. Winnipeg became
the accounting office for all fur posts and sales shops. Exhibit 3
shows the pre-printed format for the 1910-1911 operating state-
ment, now called the trading account instead of a balance sheet
[HBCA, reel 3M280].
EXHIBIT 3
 Trading Account
Trading Account _________District Outfit 1910, Form No. 20
To inventory of goods
To goods from depot and mills
To goods and country produce purchased
To goods from other posts, etc.
To freight on goods
To interest on goods ________
By supplies or expense accounts
By supplies or servant accounts
By supplies to other posts, etc.
By inventory of goods ________
Net cost of goods sold
By cash sales
By credit sales
By bartered for furs, country produce _________
Gross profit (Per cent. Of C.L.)
Add Gain on: live stock, bad debts recovered,
fur purchased, Indian debts recovered _________
Less Expenses as per Form No. 14
Repairs and improvements (annual depreciation)
Loss on articles at fixed prices (goods depreciation)
Loss on: bad, doubtful debts, Indian debts _________
Apparent gain
__________________
Furs purchased
Cash
Freight, insurance, packing, etc.
Bartered for goods
Credit Indian
Credit Customer _________
Cost
Tariff valuation _________
Gain exclusive of profit on goods bartered
__________________
Source: HBCA [reel 3M348]
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BUDGETS AND INVENTORY RECORDS
1821 to 1860: There was, as noted, a long time lag and many
separate activities between the shipment of trade goods and
supplies from London and the eventual sale of the furs. The
coordination of the various activities or parts was necessary for
profitability, and the HBC had a detailed budgeting system for
coordination. The word “budget” was not used by the HBC,
instead they had the “indent,” which was comparable to a bud-
get. Simpson, HBC governor for the entire 1821 to 1860
subperiod, expressed his thoughts on indents during his first
winter (1820-1821) in North America with the pre-merger HBC.
He had been placed in charge of what was then called the
Athabasca Department, consisting of five districts. Two of the
districts were small and emerging (McKenzie River and New
Caledonia), while the other three (Peace River, Athabasca Lake,
and Great Slave Lake) were more developed with each consist-
ing of four separate trading posts.
Simpson specified the trading goods, supplies, and comple-
ment of employees [Rich, 1938, pp. 141-169]. This indent con-
tained nearly 500 different items that were tentatively requested
in various quantities, allocated to the five districts, and further
allocated within three of those districts to 12 posts. Trading
goods were listed in alphabetical order from “augers” to “worm
gun” and “worsted, assorted colours.” (Actually, the last entry
was “plough shear” which seems to have been overlooked and
then entered at the end.) He also specified 16 food items, from
butter to tea, although the managers and employees were ex-
pected to obtain the majority of their food supplies themselves
or through trade. Ten different supply items for canoes were
specified, as were seven leather and fur items for posts to make
their own clothing. The employee complement was specified at
three levels — clerks, interpreters, and men.
The physical count of inventories was the starting point for
an indent.5  From inventory records, the clerks prepared a
“scheme distribution;” i.e., a planned distribution of trade
goods and supplies to posts from existing inventories for the
current year and the next to meet expected trade. When the
outfit for the current year arrived, a “scheme indent” was devel-
oped specifying the expected post needs for the next two years.
5This discussion on the development of the various indents from the inven-
tory records was summarized from May [1987, pp. 47-68].
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Subsequently, the “master indent” was prepared as the basis for
the importation of trade goods and supplies for the next two
years. The master indent was specific in terms of items and size
(small, large, etc.), quantities, supplier/vendor, and cost. For
example, the 1825 York Factory (i.e., Northern Department)
indent specified 600 three-point blankets at a cost of 15 shil-
lings each for a total cost of £450 [HBCA, reel 374]. The post
indents were compiled into district indents, which were accu-
mulated into department indents.
The 1831-1832 “Scheme Distribution and Invoice Book” for
York Factory was a vivid example of the care that went into
inventory planning and distribution. Its purpose was to allocate
trading goods and supplies to districts and shops. The total of
that distributed equalled that available. The following catego-
ries were specifically placed along the horizontal of this docu-
ment: beginning inventory, importation of trading goods and
supplies, a list of the various districts, general shop (employees’
residence), officers shop, contingency, and total [HBCA, reel
1M835]. Along the vertical, trading goods and supplies were
listed in alphabetical order, comparable to the “Store Balance
Book.”
1670 to 1774: The first two indents were merely lists of articles
based on the past experience of Groseilliers and Radisson in
trading for furs with the aborigines in New France. For the
1672 outfit, the Committee again depended on Groseilliers and
Radisson, along with the help of Gillam, the captain on an
earlier voyage, and Bayly, an early bayside trader [Rich, 1960a,
p. 70]. These indents recognized that careful consideration was
important because what was shipped had to be appropriate as
replacements and took at least a full year [Rich, 1960a, p. 153].
The Committee began early to prepare a “Sheame of what
goods are necessary to buy against the next Shipping.” At their
meeting in 1681, a subcommittee was appointed to determine
the:
. . . quantity of the Several Species of Goods and other
Provisions that are to be furnished for the next
Expedicion and accordingly to bespeake and agree for
them and Mr. Stone is to present to them a paper of all
things that were Sent the last Voyage for their guide
and direction [transcribed by Rich, 1945, p. 109].
In this way, the Committee became capable of reconciling
shipments with inventories and trade [Rich, 1960a, p. 156]. For
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example, a 1684 letter to bayside trader Sergeant from the
Committee demonstrates its increased sophistication with re-
spect to trade and implies that indents were being prepared by
bayside traders [transcribed by Rich, 1948, p. 122]. The Com-
mittee says, “(t)he Invoice of Goods you say is wanting in the
Countrey we Judge is very Extravagant for your Advicer has
done it without consideration as in some things we will touch
upon to make you sensible of the rest.” It goes on to say, with
an example of short guns, that with existing inventory there will
be enough guns for more than two and a half years of sales at
the quantity sold in a year if the full amount of the request is
shipped, and that two years of inventory is the maximum that
will be tolerated. In addition, by 1703, the Committee was ask-
ing for two-year indents. There was resistance, as seen in the
letter from John Fullartine at Albany to the Committee [tran-
scribed by Davies, 1965, p. 7]. Nevertheless, indenting was done
for two years and extended when operations were moved inland
after 1774.
Similarly, from the earliest years, the HBC was concerned
with tracking inventory. The Committee’s minutes for 1671-
1674 indicate that records were maintained of trade goods, sup-
plies, and furs loaded on ships, unloaded, and transferred [tran-
scribed by Rich, 1942, pp. 3-5]. The following was an example
of those instructions:
That the Accountante & husbande (warehouseman)
forthwith make out perfecte invoices & gett billes of
Ladeing Signed by the two comanders for all goods &
provisions that are Laden aboard the two shippes to
bee delivered to the governour together with his in-
structions, copies of all which are to bee kept here, &
to See that the Shippes bee forthwith cleared at the
Customehouse here [transcribed by Rich, 1942, p. 115].
Nixon, who became a bayside trader in 1679, was urged by
the Committee to handle trade goods systematically, to return
defective or unattractive goods, and to see that his warehouse
keeper sent home annual lists of the stock on hand at the end of
each season [Rich, 1960a, p. 109]. Furthermore, in 1683, the
Committee sent instructions to Sergeant that he send home
yearly a list of all employees (“Serveants in the Bay and their
severall Employments”) and a list of all trade goods and sup-
plies (“an exact Account . . . of what remaines of all sorts of
provissions and Stores as well as of Goods & Merchandizes in
every of our Factories”) in order to better manage operations
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(“that we may the better know what to sende”) [transcribed by
Rich, 1948, p. 79]. By 1692, there was growing evidence of
meticulous record keeping. For example, in a letter to trader
Geyer at York, the Committee asked: “There is a Box of Indian
paint mentioned in Capt. Edgcombes Journall, wch.we never
Received. We desire to be informed of it” [transcribed by Rich,
1957, p. 138].
However, it was not until 1810 that there were significant
changes to the recording of inventories. An additional list was
required of the quantity of goods of every denomination at all
locations, in physical and monetary terms. The records were to
be accurate and not estimates. Inventory counts were to be
done at the end of each season and valued at cost plus an
advance to cover the expenses of storage and transportation of
ten percent for the principal (bayside) posts of Churchill, York,
Severn, Albany, Moose, and Eastmain, 20 percent for the trad-
ing houses within the districts of the aforementioned bayside
posts, and 30 percent for those of the two new inland posts,
Saskatchewan and Winnipeg. Note, these advances were
changed in 1813 to 2, 5, and 71⁄2 percent respectively; the
Committee’s justification was that:
We found the rates formerly proposed would be too
high, only part of the men’s time is employed in hous-
ing and transporting the Goods, the rest being occu-
pied in distributing the Goods to the [aborigines] and
collecting, packing the Furs to the bay-side all of which
operations must of course be performed after the time
of taking the remains. We have therefore considered
about 1/6 of the men’s wages as expended in this part
of the business and calculated the percentage accord-
ingly as we are satisfied that this is near enough to the
truth to answer all the purposes of the Regulation
(HBCA, reel 39).
1880 to 1914: The modernization of communications and trans-
portation provided the HBC with significant advantages in the
1880s. Previously, it had to finance a two-year inventory com-
pared to three months with the railway [den Otter, 1990, p. 10].
In 1885, when the CPR was completed, the HBC established
semiannual rather than annual indents, thereby saving money
as well as time [Ray, 1990, p. 73]. Later, the telegraph enabled
trade goods and supplies to be ordered directly as required
[Innis, 1956, p. 360]. The indents were primarily for ordering
items from England, which was a decreasing part of the trade
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goods and supplies since most ordering could be done easily
from local or North American suppliers as needed. Communi-
cations and transportation innovations permitted more reliable
and frequent shipments of trade goods and supplies at a lower
cost per unit than the previous system [den Otter, 1990, p.11].
The improved turnover was greatest at posts along the railway
lines [Ray, 1990, p. 89].
The Board was unwilling to forego the substantial control
that accompanied the annual outfits, not even to be more re-
sponsive to customers through more frequent ordering. The
need for both responsiveness and control was achieved by es-
tablishing a quota of capital employed6  for each post or sales
shop. In this way, the ordering would be held in check by
pre-approved limits according to a circular from the commis-
sioner [HBCA, reel 3M230]. Apparently, control over ordering
by using capital employed was successful. The HBC was able to
expand into sales shops, maintain the same fur-trading busi-
ness, and increase profits with basically the same capital em-
ployed. This success was expressed in a memorandum to the
commissioner [HBCA, reel 3M230].
Inventory was still counted annually (June 1). However, as
the 1880 to 1914 subperiod proceeded, and as a larger portion
of trade goods and supplies could be ordered and obtained rela-
tively quickly, a decreasing portion received the detailed track-
ing that was done between 1821 and 1860. Less importance was
placed on its recording because inventory was maintained for a
shorter period of time as replacements could be more easily
ordered. Two and three years of careful inventory planning
with a series of indents were no longer necessary.
STANDARDS
1821 to 1860: To be viable, the HBC had to trade for furs that
were worth more than all costs incurred. Ensuring that rev-
enues exceeded costs was complicated by the long time lags and
the multitude of costs that had to be incurred before revenues
were received from the sale of furs. The actual recording of
costs was onerous but necessary if the exchange rates between
trade goods and furs were to be sufficient to cover and exceed
6Capital employed was defined as starting inventory plus inventory re-
ceived (including that from other districts), cash, and employee wages, less
cash provided to the HBC, employee debts, and transfers of inventory to other
districts.
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all those costs. In this regard, Simpson wrote the following in
1823 to the Committee:
. . . according to the present classification of goods
with the various percentages there on much time is
lost, inconvenience experienced and numbers of errors
committed in making up the accounts as very few of
our clerks are competent to go into the necessary frac-
tional calculations with accuracy, we are therefore of
opinion that it would simplify and facilitate the busi-
ness greatly if a general average percent of inventories
and transfers for each district was adopted founded on
the actual cost and expenses of transport and shall be
glad to know if such would meet your approbation
[HBCA, reel 195].
This request was not unexpected. In 1822, the Committee
had requested a schedule of advances or markups for use in
calculating the value of inventories at posts. Those advances
were based on the “information & data within our reach, and is
probably an approximation to the true cost” [transcribed by
Fleming, 1940, p. 323]. The result was a “Schedule of Advance”
on the landed cost of trade goods and supplies [also see HBCA,
reel 508]. The markup percentage was dependent upon the dis-
tance from port (e.g., York Factory or Montreal) and to some
extent on the characteristics of the product.
Moreover, standard costs were implicitly included in each
post’s “Standard of Trade,” which related all other furs and all
trade goods to a made beaver. Individual post standards were
adjusted for local conditions, distance from York Factory or
Montreal, and changes in European fur prices. These standards
provided explicit instructions on the amount of furs to be ob-
tained from the trade goods in an outfit. In Exhibit 4, Innis
[1956, pp. 318-319] provided an example of how the standard of
trade worked for an aboriginal trapper with furs to trade.
In addition, the HBC used nonfinancial standards. With the
information on performance, Simpson, through agreement by
the chief factors in council, set travel and transportation stand-
ards in physical terms. For example, he constantly experi-
mented with routes, the design of boats, and load weights to
reduce the cost per pound shipped. Innis [1956, p. 292] noted
that careful planning increased the loads of York boats on the
North Saskatchewan River from 50 packs or pieces in 1822, to
60 in 1825, and 80 in 1833. Simpson also saved the HBC thou-
sands of pounds every year through abolishing the custom of
officers (chief factors and chief traders) travelling ahead with
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EXHIBIT 4
Trading Furs for Goods
Furs, by Type and Quantity Value of Furs
Beaver, whole or full grown, 30 =  30 whole beaver
 , half or cub, 11 =  5.5  
Otters, prime, large,  1 =  2  
  ,  , small,  1 =  1  
Fox, black prime,  1 =  2  
 , red,  3 =  1.5  
 , white,  4 =  2  
Martens,  9 =  3  
47  
The trader gives the aboriginal trapper credit for 47 whole beaver with 47
quills, signifying the value in trading goods. The trapper perhaps will choose
the following selection of trade goods.
A gun 11 quills
3 yards of cloth  9 
3 lbs. of powder  6 
8 lbs. of shot  4 
1 large blanket  8 
1 hatchet  2 
1 file  1 
1 3-gallon kettle   6 
47 
Source: Innis [1956, pp. 318-319].
their families in light canoes rather than staying with the rest of
the brigade, which travelled at the speed of the heavily loaded
freight canoes and boats. Simpson insisted that officers travel
with the freight, thus ensuring more direct control over the
movement of trade goods and supplies. This practice was speci-
fied in the 1828 standing rules and regulations for the Northern
Department [transcribed by Fleming, 1940, pp. 220-221].
1670 to 1774: The standard of trade existed from the HBC’s
beginning [Rich, 1960a, p. 75]. As the pre-contact aborigines
had no conception of the use of money, the HBC had to estab-
lish an institutional framework that permitted barter on an ac-
countable basis. To accomplish that end, a rigid standard was
established by the Committee with the assistance of Radisson
and Groseilliers. This system also prevented competition among
HBC posts and the extravagant offering of trade goods for furs.
The standard of trade encouraged a pattern of aboriginal life in
which fur hunting and the annual trade journey to the Bay
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became essential parts; certainty of trade conditions was neces-
sary [Rich, 1960a, p. 76].
Establishing the standard of trade was complex, and
though the official standard was rigid, the Committee expected
traders to be flexible. Variations were assumed as long as, in
the end, the specified trade goods produced the required furs.
This expectation was expressed in a 1688 letter from the Com-
mittee to bayside trader Geyer at Port Nelson:
We would have you keepe, to the Standard, that Mr.
Radisson agreed to, but with all to give the [aborigines]
all manner of Content and Satisfaction and in Some
goods Under Sell the French that they may be
incouraged to Come to our Factory’s and to bring their
Nations Downe [transcribed by Rich, 1957, pp. 14-15].
From 1670 to 1810, the standard of trade was basically
unchanged despite many variations to the relative prices of
goods and furs over time [Rich, 1939, p. xxi]. The official Com-
mittee-imposed standard of trade was abolished in 1810, in re-
sponse to the move inland that had begun in 1774 [HBCA, reel
6]. The singular standard which had existed for 140 years was
replaced with a unique standard of trade for each post. In ef-
fect, it was the standard of trade developed in 1810 that lasted
for decades thereafter. It was just as demanding as the rigid
Committee-imposed standard, but it became flexible or adjust-
able for costs which differed with distance from ports.
1880 to 1914: The standardized costs started to cause the prices
of some products to be out of line with those offered by com-
petitors. This problem was expressed in an 1871 letter from
Cyril Graham to the head of Committee [HBCA, reel 733].
HBC’s standard of trade was replaced and held in check by
market prices. Products continued to be assigned costs by a
technique called “cost-landed” which included invoice cost plus
all freight and charges [HBCA, reel 3M230]. These costs were
easy to ascertain as common carriers such as steamboats and,
especially, railways were used.
Without the standard of trade, and as barter was replaced
with cash prices, the amounts to pay for furs became problem-
atic. In a circular dated 1887, the Committee announced that
the prices paid for furs (i.e., the fur-buying tariff) would be set
at 20 percent less than the average price obtained at the last
London sales [HBCA, reel 3M232]. The announcement went on
to say that higher prices could be paid for higher quality furs,
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but other prices would have to be lower in order for the average
to be 20 percent less than the recent sales prices.
In summary, the standard of trade was no longer needed as
market prices existed for furs and trade goods. Standards were
used for the cash purchase of furs. Similarly, operational stand-
ards were not necessary for transportation costs as market
prices existed where previously the HBC managed its own
transportation network.
DISCUSSION
It was expected that the HBC would use management ac-
counting more extensively when subject to more uncertainty
and less extensively when there was less uncertainty. A number
of steps were followed in assessing the evidence. First, the un-
certainty facing the HBC for the 1670 to 1914 period was di-
vided into three groups of parts or activities in the fur-trade
operation – inland travel, trade conditions, and living off the
land. The uncertainty inherent in these activities was dependent
on the infrastructure and the strategy of the HBC. Infrastruc-
ture development varied from complete frontier without settle-
ments and without a monetary system to railways and tele-
graph with pioneer settlements and a monetary system.
Strategy also varied during this period. During its first century,
the HBC pursued a sedentary strategy of waiting by the Bay for
the aborigines to come to trade. With the move inland, the
strategic focus was inland trading and, after the merger with
the NWC, consolidation or cost cutting was added to that strat-
egy for 1821 to 1860. Then, from 1880 to 1914, the strategy can
be best expressed as modernization; the HBC used the develop-
ments in communications and transportation to improve opera-
tions.
Uncertainty was extensive from 1821 to 1860. Inland travel
across half the continent in canoes and crude boats included
substantial uncertainty, as did trade with aborigines when there
was no monetary system and when the traders had to live off
the land. There was more certainty during 1670 to 1774 before
inland travel was necessary and before living off the land re-
placed the annual supply shipments from London. Similarly,
uncertainty declined between 1880 and 1914. Inland travel was
simplified with developments in communications and transpor-
tation. Trade conditions became more certain and less prob-
lematic with the introduction of a monetary system. Living off
the land was no longer essential as settlement brought farmers,
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manufacturers, and merchants to supply food and clothing.
Second, four important and dominant management ac-
counting techniques were tracked over the entire 1670 to 1914
period – operating statements, budgets, inventory records, and
standards. All were used during the entire study period to vary-
ing degrees, and all four were used extensively between 1821
and 1860. For the 1670 to 1774 subperiod, budgeting (i.e., in-
dents and outfits) and inventory records were less important
and less developed because there was not the logistical uncer-
tainty associated with the inland strategic move. Operating
statements called balance sheets were comprehensive and
highly developed, but rigid, because of the made-beaver quanti-
fication. The use of standards was mixed. Standards were less
developed for operational activities because there were no re-
quirements associated with inland travel. However, the stand-
ard of trade was well developed and crucial.
Similarly, the 1880 to 1914 subperiod demonstrated less
need for management accounting. The improvements in com-
munications and transportation made possible the manage-
ment of the dispersed HBC posts and sales shops with fre-
quently prepared operating statements, which were called
trading accounts. With the use of return on capital employed,
the HBC was able to evaluate relative performance. And as
there was a cash economy, there was less need for a standard of
trade. There were markets which set per unit prices for revenue
and cost items. The detailed indents and outfits were no longer
necessary because trade goods and supplies could be ordered as
needed. Also, with the ease of obtaining inventory, the detailed
inventory records were not needed for keeping track.
In short, management accounting techniques were most
developed during the subperiod of highest uncertainty, 1821 to
1860, and less developed for 1670-1774 and 1860-1914 when
there was less uncertainty. This pattern is summarized in Ex-
hibit 5.
CONCLUDING ACCOUNTS
With contrasting conditions of uncertainty because of vari-
ous strategies and contexts, the HBC drew upon different
strengths of the four management accounting techniques. Nev-
ertheless, during each subperiod the HBC used all four tech-
niques. The first subperiod, waiting by the Bay from 1670 to
1774, saw management accounting being used to reconcile all
transactions. Trade goods and supplies were shipped, and the
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EXHIBIT 5
 Management Accounting Use Under Different
Uncertainty Conditions
 Management Accounting Techniques
Inventory Operating
Uncertainty Budgeting Records Statements Standards
1670 to 1774
Inland travel  Lower
Trade conditions  High
Living off the land  Lower
Use of Technique Lower Lower  High  Lower
1821 to 1860
Inland travel  High
Trade conditions  High
Living off the land  High
Use of Technique High High High High
1880 to 1914
Inland travel  Lower
Trade conditions  Lower
Living off the land  Lower
Use of Technique Lower Lower High Lower
Note: Uncertainty was rated as high or lower. Similarly, the use of each man-
agement accounting technique was rated as high or lower.
 Committee knew if the furs returned were appropriate. It was
in the second subperiod (1821 to 1860), after expanding inland
and after the earlier system for reconciling was found to be
inadequate in view of the extensive uncertainty being faced,
that management accounting was used to plan carefully and
profitably the multiyear shipment of trade goods and supplies.
This subperiod was the most profitable and one of careful con-
solidation, which demonstrated that managerial effort and dedi-
cation were needed to make management accounting effective.
The system was basically in place by 1810 or shortly after, but it
did not work until the appointment of Simpson as governor of
the Northern Department in 1821.
In the 1880 to 1914 subperiod, as the HBC pursued mod-
ernization, the operating statement, called the trading account,
was primarily used for managing the posts and sales shops.
This minimal accounting could be done as the uncertainty of
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the earlier subperiod had been reduced. The business was rela-
tively simple. There was a cash economy, prices and costs were
known, and communication and transportation had never been
better. In this context, the HBC truly pursued management by
numbers.
The evidence was consistent with Johnson and Kaplan’s
[1987] contention that management accounting practices
evolved positively with uncertainty. Management accounting
practices of the HBC were most developed in the 1821 to 1860
subperiod, when uncertainty was the greatest, to assist manag-
ers through information to manage a multitude of uncertain
activities or, in other words, a large number of different and
unpredictable parts. Management accounting was less preva-
lent in the other two less uncertain subperiods (1670-1774 and
1880-1914), with fewer and more predictable parts, because
managers had less need of it.
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